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The Civil Wars of the mid seventeenth century brought to the fore a number of pressing 
issues surrounding the politics of counsel.  In the English theatre of that conflict, counsel 
provided a useful tool by which parliament first criticised the policies of the 1630s Personal 
Rule, then levered itself into position as the dominant element within the mixed constitution, 
and ultimately claimed sovereignty.  The crucial phase of parliamentary manoeuvring, from 
the autumn of 1641 to the summer of 1642, was a major contributor to the formation of the 
royalist party which Charles I had lacked a year before.  Overplaying their hand, the English 
parliamentary opposition to Charles demanded unprecedented restraints on royal authority 
backed up by orchestrated mob violence in London.  Parliament’s insistence that the king 
ought to take their advice rather than that of his privy council is a salient reminder that the 
role of counsel remained central to political argument on the eve of Civil War.  Nevertheless, 
the period after 1642 has seen minimal historiographical attention to counsel.  The 
assumption, explicitly stated by John Guy and James Hart, is that the 1640s and 1650s were 
the point where counsel vanished, temporarily or permanently, from political life.  For Guy, 
in the 1650s the rhetoric of counsel became ‘redundant’; for Hart, the regicide wiped away 
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‘notions of accountability, of advice and consent, and of counsel’.1  This chapter questions 
these assumptions, demonstrating that the language of counsel remained a vital part of 
English royalist thought after 1642. 
 Royalists, as recent studies have shown, were far from a united or uniform group.  
David Smith emphasised the ‘constitutional royalists’, critics of Charles I’s prerogative rule 
who swung in mid-1641 to the king as the best guarantor of the established law.2  Their 
manifesto was the Answer to the XIX Propositions of June 1642, which famously positioned 
Charles as the capstone of a mixed and balanced constitution consisting of monarchy, 
aristocracy and democracy – king, Lords and Commons as the three estates of the realm.  
Nonetheless, as other scholars have emphasised, constitutional royalists did not enjoy a 
monopoly of the king’s side, and the Answer was condemned as erroneously giving away too 
much (demoting the king to a mere estate and omitting the bishops entirely).  Barbara 
Donegan has described the king’s party as a ‘rainbow coalition’, while David Scott rejects a 
juridical and constitutional taxonomy in favour of a division between those willing to ally 
with French, Irish or Scottish Catholics and Presbyterians and those who wanted to protect 
                                                          
* My thanks are due to Paul Seaward, Roger Mason, Colin Kidd and an external referee for 
commenting on a draft of this article. 
1 J. S. Hart, jr, ‘Rhetoric and Reality: Images of Parliament as Great Council’, in M. Braddick 
and D. L. Smith (eds), The Experience of Revolution in Stuart Britain and Ireland 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 94; J. Guy, ‘The Rhetoric of Counsel in 
Early Modern England’, in D. Hoak (ed.), Tudor Political Culture (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), p. 310. 
2 D. L. Smith, Constitutional Royalism and the Search for Settlement (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1994).  cf. P. Seaward, ‘Constitutional and Unconstitutional Royalism’, 
Historical Journal, 40 (1997), 227-39. 
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the Church of England even at the cost of military defeat.3 While Scott is correct to see a 
constantly shifting pattern of quarrels and changing alliances, he underestimates the way in 
which these could provoke and reflect constitutional or ideological differences of opinion 
about royal powers. 
 This chapter demonstrates the continuing centrality of counsel to one leading royalist, 
Sir Edward Hyde, later earl of Clarendon, an important figure from the 1640s to the 1660s, 
but one who is hard to place unambiguously as a ‘constitutional’ or ‘unconstitutional’ 
royalist.  It first outlines how Hyde refuted parliament’s claims to conciliar dominance 
through arguments partly shared with, and partly distinct from, those in the famous Answer to 
the XIX Propositions.  This evidences how counsel could be used either to support or to 
depress pretensions to power.  It then shows how the factious character of Civil War and 
Interregnum royalism provoked Hyde and his allies into a series of claims about the 
importance of the privy council (or at least of privy councillors) to securing the monarchy, 
before exploring the apparent paradox of their insistence on respect for the council while 
practising counsel outside it.  Here Hyde’s work demonstrates the complex relationship 
between institutional councils and informal counsel, and how important the oath of a 
councillor was to seventeenth-century advisers’ sense of what they were undertaking in 
counselling rulers.  The final two sections turn to consider the subtle ways in which Hyde 
attributed royalist failures to both bad counsel and bad kingship and how he navigated giving 
unwelcome advice to monarchs.  In what circumstances could counsel be withheld and how 
could criticisms of royal policy be made?  How did Hyde, who saw counsel as founded on 
friendship, work with councillors he despised? 
                                                          
3 B. Donegan, ‘Varieties of Royalism’, and D. Scott, ‘Counsel and Cabal in the King’s Party, 
1642-1646’, in J. McElligott and D. L. Smith (eds), Royalists and Royalism during the 
English Civil Wars (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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 Thus as both a practitioner and theorist of counsel, Hyde provides a useful case study 
of how Stuart statesmen could conceive of the relationship between council and counsel, 
whether they blamed monarchs for bad decisions or fell back on scapegoating evil 
counsellors and the way in which they located good rule in a moral framework in which 
counsel helped maintain social as well as political relationships.  These questions will be 
explored through the Declarations which Hyde penned on the king’s behalf during the 1640s, 
his correspondence in the 1640s and 1650s, his History of the Rebellion and Life, and his 
other, less well known, writings of the early 1670s.  These are not transparent texts – the 
History in particular was begun in 1646, resumed in Hyde’s second exile after his 
impeachment in 1667 and imperfectly revised with chunks of the Life spliced into it.4  As 
Brian Wormald showed in 1951, Hyde retrospectively rewrote his career as a firm supporter 
of episcopacy, when he had been much more lukewarm about this originally.5  Nevertheless 
there is sufficient consistency across all these works to draw conclusions about counsel as an 
elusive, yet crucial, part of Hyde’s conceptual apparatus.6  They bear witness to both 
counsel’s continuing importance and its ambiguities.   
                                                          
4 P. Seaward, ‘Introduction’, to his edition of Edward Hyde, earl of Clarendon, The History of 
the Rebellion (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009). 
5 B. H. G. Wormald, Clarendon: Politics, History, and Religion, 1640-1660 (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1951).  While Wormald rightly emphasised the significance of 
counsel in Hyde’s thought up to 1642, he did not explore its continuing role in the rest of 
Hyde’s career. 
6 B. Worden, ‘Clarendon: History, Religion, Politics’, in his God’s Instruments (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2012), esp. pp. 377, 396-400, rightly points out the importance of 
counsel to Clarendon, and some crucial elements of his attitude towards it.  The present 
chapter brings these elements to the forefront of discussion. 
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I 
 
In moving from condemning specific individuals as tools of arbitrary rule to generally 
constraining the king’s power to appoint privy councillors and great officers of state, English 
MPs were following in the footsteps of their Scottish Covenanting brethren.  Charles’s visit 
to Scotland in August to October 1641 had involved a heated dispute over parliamentary 
consent to appointments of great officers of state.7  When he returned to England, he faced 
the same argument, which became entangled with the practical politics of two linked 
flashpoints: control of the militia and the response to Catholic rebellion in Ireland.   
 On 5 November 1641 the leader of the parliamentary opposition to Charles, John 
Pym, offered an ‘Additional Instruction’ which refused aid to suppress the Irish Rebellion 
‘unless the King would remove his evil counsellors and take such counsellors as might be 
approved by Parliament’.  Significantly, it was Hyde who (according to the diarist D’Ewes) 
‘stood up and first opposed it’.  Changes to conciliar practices were more important than 
attacks on the Church in Hyde’s move from being a critic to a supporter of the king.8  Pym 
                                                          
7 The Nicholas Papers: The Correspondence of Edward Nicholas, Secretary of State, ed. G. 
F. Warner, 4 vols (Westminster, Nichols and Sons, 1886-1920; henceforth Nicholas), I, 38-
52. 
8 J. P. Kenyon, The Stuart Constitution (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 
227; Wormald, Clarendon, pp. 20-22.  A motion about great officers of state of 28 October 
was in ‘so extreme a strain as Mr Hyde did upon a sudden confute most of it’. For discussion 
of parliament’s claims described in this section see M. Mendle, ‘The Great Council of 
Parliament and the First Ordinances: The Constitutional Theory of the Civil War’, Journal of 
British Studies, 31 (1992), 133-62. 
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had to withdraw his suggestion of parliamentary approval of councillors and, a month later, 
the Grand Remonstrance begged instead for the appointment of those ‘Parliament may have 
cause to confide in’.  While Charles promised to appoint able advisers, he swiftly asserted his 
‘undoubted right’ to summon whom he pleased.9  In the months following Charles’s 
departure from London after his failure to arrest his leading opponents in January 1642, the 
fissures between future royalists and Parliamentarians began to widen.   
 Counsel loomed large in this process of polarisation.  Significantly, both sides praised 
it, but simultaneously evidenced very different understandings of it.  On 19 February 1642 
parliament demanded Charles admit only those advisers they recommended, and exclude the 
queen entirely from policy making, appointments and counsels.10  While this direct attack on 
the king’s wife fell away in the following months, the demand that the king reject ‘private’ 
counsel in favour of parliament and their appointees echoed throughout the declarations and 
counter-declarations of 1642.  The first of the Nineteen Propositions, parliament’s main 
manifesto, required parliamentary approval of existing and future privy councillors and 
officers of state, the second that public affairs be debated in parliament, not by ‘private … 
unknown or unsworn councillors’ and that decisions appropriate to the privy council only be 
deemed valid if taken by ‘the advice and consent of the major part of your council, attested 
by their hands’.11 
 The declarations which Hyde penned on Charles’s behalf had the king posturing (as in 
the Answer to the XIX Propositions) as a defender of law against a parliament undermining it 
                                                          
9 Kenyon, Stuart Constitution, pp. 230, 239; Edward Hyde, earl of Clarendon, The History of 
the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England, ed. W. D. Macray, 6 vols (Oxford, Clarendon, 
1888, repr. 1958; henceforth History, cited by volume and page number), I, 436-7. 
10 History, I, 526-7; Wormald, Clarendon, pp. 58, 110-13. 
11 Kenyon, Stuart Constitution, pp. 244-5; History, I, 579, 585, 589. 
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by an arbitrary rule which would introduce parity and confusion.  Evil counsel was 
denounced as a mere figleaf for an attack on the king.12  But while Hyde’s declarations stated 
that the king was a necessary part of parliament, unlike the Answer they refrained from 
talking about the estates.13  Most importantly, they twisted counsel into a claim to depress 
parliament’s power.  In April 1642 Hyde ventriloquised for the king an acknowledgement of 
parliament as the great council whose advice would be considered, but subordinated its 
counsel to ‘Our Understanding … any Right we had … Our own Interest and freedom’.  
Parliament offered its conciliar ‘Opinion’ to the king, but he was ‘free to discent [sic] (till 
Our Reason be convinced for the general good)’.14  In April and May parliament’s 
declarations grew bolder.  First insisting that the king ought to assist his own understanding 
by the wisdom of parliament (the eyes in the body politic), the Houses eventually crossly 
asserted that ‘the votes of the Lords and Commons in Parliament, being the Great Council of 
the kingdom, are the reason of the King and of the kingdom’.  Eventually they declared their 
exercise of ‘the King’s supreme and royal pleasure … after a more eminent and obligatory 
                                                          
12 History, II, 52-3; His Majesties Declaration to both Houses of Parliament … in Answer to 
that Presented to Him at Newmarket the 9 of March 1641 (London, 1642, Wing C2266), p. 3; 
His Majesties Answer to the Declaration of both Houses of Parliament concerning the 
Commission of Array of the First of July 1642 (Cambridge, 1642, Wing C2116), p. 5.  For 
Clarendon’s authorship of these see G. Roebuck, Clarendon and Cultural Continuity (New 
York, Garland, 1981).  Wormald sees a change in the tone of Hyde’s works from 26 March, 
but asserts an underlying continuity in his stance: Clarendon, pp. 83-4. 
13 His Majesties Declaration to All his Loving Subjects of the 12 of August 1642 (York, 1642, 
Wing C2249), p. 89; see Wormald, Clarendon, pp. 11-12. 
14 The Humble Petition of the Lords and Commons … Presented to his Majesty, 18 April 
(York, 1642, Wing E1577), pp. 18-20.   
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manner than it can be by [his] personal act’.15  Throughout the 1640s, the language of evil 
counsel continued to be a motivating tool in recruitment to the Parliamentarian side, cited by 
soldiers, preachers and in raising revenue.  If rhetorical justification of behaviour, it could 
also motivate action: it was invoked in 1643 by the Earl of Stamford in his refusal to 
surrender Exeter to the king until Charles left the counsel of ‘old serpents’ and ‘caterpillars’ 
and directed himself ‘by the light of your Majesty’s best council, the Parliament’.16 
 While the Houses’ claims grew, the royalist refutation remained static: every assertion 
of parliament’s special conciliar status was met with a polite acknowledgement of their role 
as a council, but one offering mere counsel.  They were Charles’s ‘counsellors, not 
commanders, (for, however they frequently confounded them, the offices were several,) and 
counsellors not in all things, but in some things, de quibusdam arduis, etc’.17  While Hyde did 
not endorse the idea of three equally empowered and balanced estates described in the latter 
half of the Answer, there was some shared ground.  Like Hyde, the first half of the Answer 
urged parliament to trust the king to choose the correct counsellors, promised to remove any 
who acted illegally and twice offered that they swear an oath to maintain the whole law.  The 
suggestion that parliament approve councillors and that the king be obliged to have them sign 
off his orders provoked an angry claim that this would be the ‘worst kinde of minority’, ‘at 
once to depose both Our Self and Our Posteritie’.  Disdainfully, Charles’s mouthpieces 
insisted that he be able to take advice ‘from any person known or unknown, sworn or 
unsworn’, as he, like any subject, had the right ‘of discoursing with whom We please, of what 
                                                          
15 History, II, 104, 131 (emphasis mine); Kenyon, Stuart Constitution, p. 249. 
16 History, II, 179, 314, 321; State Papers Collected by Edward Earl of Clarendon, 3 vols 
(Oxford, 1767-86; henceforth Clar. SP), II, 151. 
17 History, II, 153-4.   
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We please’, in or out of the council, and to treat their suggestions ‘as Advices, not as 
Commands’.18 
 This drew on a growing seventeenth-century tendency to deploy the language of 
counsel to diminish rather than claim power.  In the sixteenth century the claim that a person 
was a counsellor acted as a marker of status and boosted their prestige.  In the early Stuart 
era, it was used by monarchs to denigrate their opponents.  Thus where Elizabeth I had 
refuted unwelcome parliamentary advice with the claim that she would hear other counsel, 
under Charles I parliament’s conciliar status was acknowledged but treated as inferior.  
Elizabeth deflected the Commons with the assertion that she would answer their plea for her 
to marry ‘upon further advise’ or that she had conferred with the ‘well learnede and … 
askede theyre opynyns’ on the succession.19  She might tell MPs that they were not 
counsellors on a particular matter, but she was less inclined to disparage counsel per se than 
Charles, who began to stress the distinction between advice-givers and commanders in his 
speeches to parliament: 
 His Majesty doth not forget that the Parliament is his Council, and therefore 
ought to have the liberty of a council; but His Majesty understands the 
difference between council and controlling, and between liberty and the abuse 
of liberty. 
Charles’s supporters likewise denigrated counsel: at the Ship Money trial, Sir Robert 
Berkeley admitted that parliament was ‘commune concilium regis et regni’, but snidely added 
                                                          
18 His Majesties Answer to the XIX Propositions (London, 1642), esp. sigs. A2v-Br, B3r of 
Wing C2123A. 
19 T. E. Hartley, Proceedings in the Parliaments of Elizabeth I, 3 vols (London and Leicester, 
Leicester University Press, 1992-5), I, 95, 147. 
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‘yet give me leave to say that it is but a concilium’.20  Hyde’s works do not go so far, but they 
reflect this new tendency to use conciliar status as a way of demeaning his opponents.  He 
admitted that a good parliament could provide useful advice.  Parliamentary counsel was 
legitimate when invited by the king.  However, such assemblies risked becoming fora for 
populist politicking.  So he endorsed limited and specific parliamentary privileges, including 
freedom of speech, but saw this as a problematic privilege because it both underpinned 
conciliar status and generated the excessive freedom of popular councils.21  He was willing to 
present the king as open to parliamentary advice at the Restoration.  But he was also keen to 
exercise caution: the king should consider what a free parliament would think fit to ask, but 
not promise to settle the kingdom as parliament should advise.22 
  
II 
 
Seventeenth-century writers all agreed counsel was an important element of good rule.  
However, they quarrelled over whether it should be institutionalised in councils and, if so, 
which ones (parliament or privy council), and how far the king was obliged to heed them.  An 
initial survey of Hyde’s works suggests that he thought the privy council ought to be the main 
source of counsel.  Throughout his career he complained of whispers outside the privy 
council which both Charles I and Charles II were too inclined to heed.  These undermined the 
                                                          
20 Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, ed. S. R. Gardiner, 3rd edn (Oxford, 
Clarendon, 1906), pp. 4-5; Kenyon, Stuart Constitution, p. 114. 
21 Edward Hyde, earl of Clarendon, A Brief View and Survey of the Dangerous and 
Pernicious Errors to Church and State in Mr Hobbes’s Book, entitled Leviathan (Oxford, 
1676), pp. 57-8; History, III, 293-4, I, 532-4, 7-8. 
22 History, VI, 204; Clar. SP, III, 289. 
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authority of a crucial institution and thus of the king.  In book three of his History, penned on 
Jersey in 1646, he offered a paean of praise to the privy council as the basis for ‘the 
reputation, if not the government, of the State’.  Hyde suggested that an ideal council would 
contain a variety of opinions within bounds.  Councillors must uphold the king’s ‘essential’ 
‘dignity … freedom … [and] jurisdiction’, although they might debate the best means to do 
so.  Ostensibly commenting on the ‘bridge’ appointments of 1641, by which Charles I 
brought some of his critics onto the council to neutralise them, but probably with the 
divisions which had dogged the royalist cause between the mainly civilian Oxford privy 
council and the mainly military king’s council of war in mind, Hyde insisted that monarchs 
could not be too careful in choosing their councillors.  On this ‘much of their safety, more of 
their honour and reputation (which is the life itself of princes) both at home and abroad, 
necessarily depends’.  The council should be kept small, to avoid delegating business to sub-
committees which made ostensible members feel excluded.  This was partly a comment on 
the failures of the Personal Rule, partly one of the problems of royalist councils in the 1640s.  
Princes should also avoid choosing ‘mean’ men.23  ‘Mean’ was one of the keywords of 
Hyde’s political vocabulary.  Occasionally carrying social connotations, it more frequently 
bore a moral implication.  The moral and political failings of critics of the council are 
symbolised by one of Hyde’s royalist enemies, George, Baron Goring, who slides seamlessly 
from ‘his usual license of drinking, and then inveighing against the Prince’s council’ to 
‘inveighing likewise in an unpardonable dialect against the person of the King’.24   
                                                          
23 History, I, 259-61; III, 223-6 makes the reference to 1640s councils clear.  See also 
Worden, ‘Clarendon’, p. 396. 
24 History, IV, 63.  After the Restoration, Hyde would complain of ‘mean’ Presbyterians 
entering the privy council: The Life of Edward Earl of Clarendon, 2 vols (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1857; henceforth, Life), I, 276.  On the royalist councils see I. Roy, ‘The 
12 
 
 Hyde’s justification for the importance of the privy council did not rest on an exalted 
view of monarchy.  A widely respected council was vital since a king was ‘not thought a 
great monarch when he follows the reins of his own reason and appetite, but when, for the 
informing his reason and guiding his actions, he uses the service, industry, and faculties of 
the wisest men’.25  This fairly traditional statement of the importance of supplementing an 
individual man’s imperfect knowledge with broader wisdom, with an added gloss of the 
importance for the king’s reputation of doing this, was presented as an explanation of why 
the bridge appointments had failed.26  Charles had brought onto the council a group of men 
who believed they owed their places to their importance in parliament, and thus refused to 
advise the king as to when he should reject parliament’s demands.  But even more to blame 
were the other councillors who ‘most supinely and stupidly’ accepted this, failing in their 
‘duty’ to advise the king on his relations with parliament and to dissuade him from giving up 
his prerogative rights.27  As will be seen, for Hyde counsel was a moral obligation, not just a 
political duty. 
 The need to boost the prestige of the institutional council was often reiterated by 
Hyde, his friend Edward Nicholas (secretary of state) and their correspondent and fellow 
member of the Oxford privy council Christopher Hatton, Baron Hatton.  Writing to Nicholas 
in January 1655, Hatton complained that the influence of the queen’s favourite Jermyn at the 
exiled court meant ‘wee are looking at single governing [i.e. a minister-favourite] and not at 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Royalist Council of War, 1642-6’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 35 (1962), 
150-68; Scott, ‘Counsel and Cabal’. 
25 History, I, 261. 
26 Although this is retrospective: Hyde had originally supported these appointments and could 
even be seen as one of them: Wormald, Clarendon, pp. 5-7. 
27 History, I, 262; Worden, ‘Clarendon’, p. 380. 
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union of councells and the honour of a councell bord, without which monarchy will never 
buoy up again’.  In March he repeated that only ‘a well ordred vnited councell’ would solve 
royalist fractiousness.  ‘Councell, Councell vnited and resolutly pursued, must doe the deed, 
or nothing.’28 
 Hyde and Nicholas found a model for a successful and prestigious privy council in 
Elizabethan history.  Nicholas emphasised how Charles I 
 lost all by despising of councils and by undervaluing of counsellors, so Queen 
Elizabeth kept up her honour and esteem by the value she set on councils and 
on her counsellors. 
This monarch 
 would never endure to hear any person speak slighting words of any of her 
council, saying that they were her outworks and that whosoever should go 
about to slight them would in the next place assault her.29 
Where this view of Elizabeth’s virtuous regard for her council came from is hard to pin 
down: perhaps from her proclamations and speeches, perhaps from works commemorating 
her.  Royalists were clearly reading Elizabeth’s first historian, William Camden: Hyde had 
done so in the 1620s and in October 1655 the Clerk of the Council Joseph Jane apologised to 
Nicholas that he could not find a copy of Camden in The Hague, but promised to send one 
via a mutual contact in Cologne.30  But Camden’s history does not depict Elizabeth as 
                                                          
28 Nicholas, II, 155-6, 230-1. 
29 Nicholas, I, 305, 311-12. 
30 Nicholas, III, 83.  On Elizabeth’s view of counsel, see Susan Doran’s chapter in this 
volume. 
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influenced by a wise council, an image which seemed to begin in the 1650s.31  Yet a decade 
earlier, Nicholas had asked for extracts from the council records of its ‘most signal acts of 
power … in the best of times; as in the times of H.7. H.8. Q. Eliz and beginning of K. 
James’.32 
 
III 
 
Despite this frequent praise for the institution of the privy council, its place in the practice of 
Hyde’s counsel to the king seems remarkably limited.  Partly this was a matter of practical 
necessity – as its members were scattered by warfare and exile, they could not meet as a body 
to advise the king.  But Hyde’s passing mentions of where and how he counselled monarchs 
place these encounters in informal settings and not formal meetings.  He met Charles I on the 
backstairs when the king was half dressed, in the privy gallery with the door locked, in his 
bedchamber and often walking in the garden, this last being ‘a fit opportunity … when 
[Charles I] was always most willing to be entertained’.33  It is possible that these episodes 
were retrospectively re-imagined and cited to demonstrate Hyde’s intimacy with the king.  
Yet even if the depictions are inaccurate, their inclusion shows that Hyde thought it 
acceptable to depict himself and the king violating the need to hear the privy council rather 
than whispers on the back stairs.   
                                                          
31 J. Watkins, Representing Elizabeth in Stuart England (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), pp. 102-3; J. Watkins, ‘“Old Bess in the Ruff”: Remembering Elizabeth I, 1625-
1660’, English Literary Renaissance, 30 (2000), 95-116.  Paulina Kewes suggests to me that 
this might have derived from plays. 
32 Clar. SP, II, 382-3. 
33 Life, I, 99, 101, 111, 123-5, 143-4, 154 (qu.). 
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 Throughout his career Hyde would seek and give counsel outside the institutional 
council.  He urged Charles II to circulate the draft proclamation in response to the regicide 
beyond the council to test support for it.34  After 1660, he encouraged the restored king to 
make major decisions outside formal council meetings, which merely ratified them.  He 
praised the ‘secret committee … which, under the notion of foreign affairs, were appointed 
by the king to consult all his affairs before they came to a public debate’.35  Clarendon refers 
to meetings of this secret committee in his house or chamber in ways which suggest it was 
used to iron out disagreements.  Use it, he urged the king, ‘that we may be of one mind’; ‘if 
you please to walk one turn in the gallery after Council, you will be able the better to prepare’ 
for the next formal council meeting.36 
 How might we reconcile this apparent conflict between an insistence on respect for 
the privy council and willing use of secret individual counsel?  One answer would be not to 
expect coherence.  Hyde’s comments are scattered throughout the thousands of pages of his 
History, Life, essays and correspondence rather than systematised in a single formal treatise.  
Another would be to say he was willing to do whatever it took to get his advice to the king.  
But a third possibility is that Hyde and Nicholas did not conceive of the privy council as a 
series of formal meetings, but as a group of people who had sworn a particular oath to the 
king.  When we examine their works closely, we see a division between the king’s sworn 
councillors, heard in whatever setting, and his unsworn ones.37  Attending to the oath helps us 
                                                          
34 History, V, 42. 
35 Life, I, 315. 
36 Clar. SP, III, supplement, xlvii-xlix. 
37 Thus the committee for foreign affairs might in practice have removed debate from the 
privy council, but this was perhaps acceptable if it was constituted entirely of privy 
councillors.  This contrasts with E. I. Carlyle, ‘Clarendon and the Privy Council’, English 
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move away from the institutional and administrative history of the privy council beloved by 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century historians, and re-orientate ourselves to early modern 
understandings of this body.   
 Passing references to the oath suggest how important it was to these royalists.  
Sometimes its moral weight remained implicit, as when Hatton linked the disastrous attempt 
by Henrietta Maria to convert the king’s younger brother, the Duke of Gloucester, to 
Catholicism in 1654 on private counsel overriding the king’s ‘sworn Privy Council’.38  When 
the earl of Bristol converted to Catholicism in 1659 Hyde seemed particularly pained at this 
defection by a ‘sworn’ councillor.  When especially moved, he would mention the oath.  He 
invoked it to justify his own behaviour in condemning his daughter’s unauthorised marriage 
to the Duke of York, pressing the king to send her to the Tower ‘upon all my oaths which I 
have taken to you to give you faithful counsels’.  So important was the oath, he wrote 
elsewhere, that the king could not dispense with it.39   
 Occasionally the importance of the oath was made more explicit.  Hatton bemoaned 
how those advising the king outside the privy council were under less moral restraint than 
those ‘true Councellors’ who had sworn it, who had thereby bound themselves to care for the 
public good.  In early 1650, when Hatton made this remark, care for the public good 
translated into protecting the Church of England by not entering into the alliance with 
Presbyterian Scotland advocated by those surrounding Henrietta Maria at her base in the 
Louvre.  The advisers he complains about are those of ‘the Louvre Presbyter and Scot 
designe’.  Hatton’s following comment that the king should not share secrets and counsel 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Historical Review, 27 (1912), 251-73, which emphasises the institutional council, not 
committees; perhaps because Carlyle based his account on Hyde’s Life. 
38 Nicholas, II, 129-30. 
39 Life, I, 425, 325; History, I, 258. 
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with any except ‘a well chosen competent number of wise and discreete, but above all 
religious and faithfull, sworne councellors’ is less an insistence that proper counsel comes 
from an institutional setting than on the importance of recognising the moral obligations 
counsel involves.40  If for Hatton the oath’s utility lay in the obligation to serve the public 
good, for Hyde it appears to have been the requirement to keep the king’s affairs secret – in 
the context of his constant moaning that the Louvre group around the queen chatted about 
Charles’s affairs in the most indiscreet way.  Leaking council secrets was, he noted, ‘directly 
contrary to their oath’.41  Hyde agreed with Nicholas that new councillors should be formally 
sworn in, although admitted that his opponents’ lack of principles made oaths of limited use 
as a form of moral gatekeeping.  If such men had no moral sense, Hyde pointed out, then they 
might take an oath they did not truly believe in.  Thus the oath was not a reliable way of 
excluding undesirable advisers.  But it was a way of reasserting a morally grounded 
government which would exercise due prudence, but not succumb to the reason of statist 
tendency to endorse all expedients in an effort to win back power.  
 Although Charles II took on his father’s councillors in 1649, it appears – strikingly – 
that most remained unsworn until April 1653, perhaps not coincidentally, one of the periodic 
points of Interregnum regime change.42  This poses an unexpected problem: what oath did 
these people actually swear?  Contrary to common historical parlance, there was no single 
oath of a privy councillor.  Over the previous eighty years, a number of different oaths had 
been sworn.  Comparing them shows both the changing understanding of what counsel was 
for, and the pressure of immediate circumstances.  Two versions exist from 1558.  One, 
drafted by William Cecil, swore the taker to counsel ‘as maye best … tend to the safety’ of 
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queen and commonweal, reflecting the security concern at the forefront of the fledgling 
Elizabethan regime’s mind.  The second, like Walter Mildmay’s of 1567, by contrast 
promised to advise ‘all things that may be to the Queenes honor, & behalfe, & to the good of 
her realmes, Lorps, & subjects’.  Yet even this did not remain in place for long.  The oath 
taken by Shrewsbury in 1571 (which provided the base text for those of the following 
decades) did not contain this clause, although it maintained the promise of impartiality, 
allegiance and secrecy.  The last extant before Hyde was writing, that in the privy council 
register of October 1640, insisted on true and faithful service to the king, protecting his 
‘person, honour, Crowne, or dignity Royall’ and jurisdiction.  The counsellor swore to keep 
matters of counsel secret, and to declare his opinion ‘according to your heart, and 
Conscience’ (‘conscience’ being a new addition of 1613).  In general the 1640 oath was tilted 
much more strongly towards upholding royal authority than the early Elizabethan ones, 
matching the trend towards using counsel to uphold rather than restrain royal authority.  
Hatton’s emphasis on a sworn councillor’s requirement to care for the public good is striking, 
for although this was a fundamental feature of early Elizabethan oaths, it at no point appears 
in the oath of 1640.43 
 These royalists’ regard for the oath was partly a result of their emphasis on a moral 
rather than constitutional framework for good government.  Virtuous rule was not created by 
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a set of institutional limitations on monarchs but by encouraging good behaviour.44  There 
may also have been another stimulus.  The Civil Wars had exposed the tensions inherent in 
apparently platitudinous promises to serve the king and his crown, as the Parliamentarians 
initially built their case on defending the monarchy against the person of Charles Stuart.  
Furthermore, while previous historians have acknowledged parliament’s claims of 1641 to 
1642 to approve or appoint privy councillors, they have neglected the parallel calls for 
parliament to determine the oath advisers swore.  While the Grand Remonstrance was less 
radical than the Additional Instruction in dropping calls for approval of councillors, it 
introduced the requirement ‘that all Councillors of State may be sworn to observe those laws 
which concern the subject in his liberty’.  The Nineteen Propositions stated that councillors 
should swear to ‘the due execution of their places, in such form as shall be agreed upon by 
both Houses’ and that they and the judges should swear to ‘the maintaining of the Petition of 
Right and of certain statutes made by Parliament’.45   
 Royalists insisted that the king ought to be able to choose his councillors.  Could they 
have accepted parliament imposing an oath on them?  In the dark post-regicidal days of 
September 1649, Hyde was seemingly willing to countenance an act ‘for the swearing all 
Privy Councellors to the observacion of the Lawe’.46  Striking though this looks, it cohered 
with his sense of the best monarchy being a self-restraining one, which would observe 
established laws.  It also combined a statutory basis with a framework for conciliar good 
behaviour independent of the whims of parliament – councillors would swear to uphold ‘the 
Lawe’ generally, not specific statutes.  Yet for all Hyde’s insistence on the importance of the 
oath as a way of encouraging good counsel, he may have recognised that this could not 
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totally fence in a pair of kings too much inclined to take the wrong advice.  Did the problems 
of the king’s party stem from bad counsel, or from a failure of kingship? 
 
IV 
 
Advocates of counsel often appear to be unimaginatively falling back on banal pleas for good 
rule, based on an ingenuous belief that kings would be able to identify and be willing to take 
good advice.  Hyde’s works demonstrates that those reflecting on counsel were far from 
naïve, for he criticised both the givers and the recipients of bad counsel.  When analysing 
royalist losses in the climacteric year 1645, he rebuked the laziness and negligence of his own 
side, particularly their ‘irresolution and unsteadiness … ill humour and faction’, a party who 
erred ‘sometimes in deliberating too long without resolving, and as often resolving without 
any deliberation, and … not executing vigorously what was well deliberated and resolved’.  
Directly confronting the question of whether this was the king’s fault, he admitted that 
Charles I could not be entirely exonerated, but insisted that the king’s greatest failing was ‘to 
depart often from his own reason, to follow the opinions of more unskilful men’.47  This 
passage was penned in 1671, when criticism of the royal martyr could only be couched in 
veiled terms, and the king was largely excused by a comment on how hard it was to find good 
ministers.  Yet this was a significant change from Hyde’s original draft of late June 1646, 
which sought to vindicate not the king, but Hyde and other members of the Prince of Wales’s 
council for blame for the failure of the royalist campaign in the West Country.48  The 
imperfectly edited text which remains thus wobbles uneasily between bemoaning slanders of 
the prince’s council and rebuking monarchs for listening to these.  This was not purely a 
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48 History, IV, 8n. 
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function of a retrospective account: Hyde’s correspondence emits the same mixed messages 
as his History and Life. 
 Occasionally Hyde optimistically argued that Charles I and his son would be able 
rulers if they used their own judgement rather than relying on the bad counsel of others.  
Indeed, throughout the 1650s Hyde was much more positive than Nicholas or Hatton about 
Charles II’s abilities and resistance to evil counsel from his mother’s associates.  He was ‘an 
excellent man’ and would fulfil all expectations ‘if he hath good men about him’ he wrote on 
3 May 1652.  Three weeks later he admitted that ‘appetite and affection’ did sometimes 
triumph, ‘which we must all labour by good counsel to prevent and divert’, but suggested that 
‘when we have done our duty we must make the best of what we cannot help, and must 
always remember that Kings are of the same mould and composition as other men’.49  This 
looked like a complacent reiteration of one of the commonplaces of theoretical treatises on 
counsel – kings are flawed mortals who need advice to overcome their passions. 
 But on other occasions Hyde directly blamed monarchs for failing to rule well.  
Charles I heeded the wrong counsel and changed fixed and carefully debated resolutions on a 
whim.  Fatally, he ‘frequently considered more the person who spoke, as he was in his grace 
or his prejudice, than the counsel itself that was given’.  This cohered with Hyde’s reading of 
the historian of the fifteenth-century French civil wars, Philippe de Commynes, who 
commented acidly on monarchs’ poor judgment of character.  Rereading Commynes in 1646 
Hyde noted Commynes’s comment on how princes ‘abhor being compelled to anythinge ther 
owne inclinations do not leade them, though never so profitable and advantageous’.50  Hyde 
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also noted how both Charles I and his son were far too willing to countenance those who 
slandered the privy council.  The Prince of Wales was contented to sit in council to learn his 
royal trade, but when he met his old nurse he failed to discourage her criticising the council.  
Again, some of the harsher criticisms could not be publicly circulated; Hyde felt it acceptable 
to say the prince had little experience, but struck out of the manuscript his comment that he 
had not ‘spent his time so well towards the improvement of his mind and understanding as 
might have been expected from his years and fortune’.51  Charles II’s laziness would continue 
to be something ‘which vexes me exceedingly’ – indeed, one of the treason charges levied 
against Hyde by his enemies in the exiled court in 1654 was reportedly his comment that 
Charles was too lazy.52  Hyde was especially pained by Charles’s willingness to make 
promises which he reneged on, generating not just deleterious political instability, but also a 
series of distressing moral dilemmas.53   
 These criticisms were established before the Restoration and they did not go away 
afterwards.  While Clarendon clung to the argument that the king acting on the basis of his 
own reason was the solution to the problem of bad counsel, he seemed to lack confidence in 
his monarch’s ability to do so.  Ironically, while Clarendon urged the king to act 
independently, his own influence was often criticised.  Such complaints were dramatised after 
his impeachment by the disaffected Robert Howard.  Howard’s play The Great Favourite, or 
the Duke of Lerma offers a thinly-disguised account of an overweening minister whose 
daughter becomes the object of the king’s affections, parodying the union of Clarendon’s 
daughter with the duke of York.  Lerma/Clarendon ‘seems / To make you [the monarch] 
practice power unlimited; / Just then you have the least, obeying his’.  Ironically given 
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Hyde’s emphasis on the privy council, Howard depicts it as ‘wither’d’ ‘strangers’ to the 
business of a king who has lost all majesty to his favourite.  ‘If you look after him that shou’d 
be King / You may perhaps find him in Lerma’s pocket.’54  Yet Howard also criticises the 
king for having ‘Resign’d my Reason to / My Love’.  Charles’ sexual inclinations are as 
problematic as his minister’s machinations.55 
 Clarendon insisted that the extent of his power derived from a lazy ruler devolving 
business to him.56  While his account is self-exculpatory his language is nonetheless 
significant.  The word licence – another one of his favourite terms – is deployed to complain 
both about the king’s pleasure-mongering and about his excessive accessibility.  The king’s 
licence creates a court with ‘all doors open to all persons’ such as the Spanish ambassador, 
who undermines his carefully planned Portuguese marital alliance.  It leaves him open to the 
Presbyterians who nearly got him to delay the enforcement of the 1662 Act of Uniformity.57  
And it renders him vulnerable to ‘the witty men for the evening conversation’ who first joked 
with the king and then censured his trusted counsellors (Clarendon) and their ‘very mature’ 
resolutions.58  His choice of terms is significant, for licence carried with it the moral baggage 
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of passion overriding reason, and thus of weak tyranny (i.e. a monarch good natured in 
themselves, but who is unable to resist evil advice).  Charles II is a king who cannot treat 
counsel seriously and does not recognise good counsel when it is offered.  He did not take the 
advice of his father’s Eikon Basilike but he did read ‘too concernedly’ a book about Henri 
IV’s love affairs.59  The premier Irish royalist Ormond shared this view, writing in 
exasperation in 1658 of the king’s ‘immoderate delight in empty effeminate and vulgar 
conversations’ – no wonder, since he was trying to recover the king’s correspondence to 
Lucy Walter, mother of his child, which she threatened to make public in late 1657 if he 
failed to pay her a promised annuity; Charles then attempted to have his bastard kidnapped.60  
Ormond nevertheless felt such an explosion of criticism should not be said ‘but to you or 
him’ since if it came ‘from any (unless a very few) but from me, or from me at any other time 
were too bold a lamentation’.61  Recognising that a monarch contributed to bad counsel was 
one thing, solving this problem quite another. 
 
V 
 
Having used counsel to analyse Hyde’s view of kingship, we may now turn to the underlying 
question of what he thought counsel was and what duties it involved.  Counsel was vital to 
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Hyde’s moral universe as a crucial element of sociability, that is, of friendship.62  Friendship 
echoes throughout Hyde’s writings as the means by which men maintain moral rectitude.  
Strikingly, almost every political actor who gets into trouble does so, according to Hyde, 
because they lack a friend who can give wise counsel.  Hyde here reflected the early modern 
understanding of friendship, steeped in a classical tradition which saw advice as the first 
obligation of amicitia.63  Hyde praised his own friends for saving him from his youthful 
follies;64 he thus believed that the king’s confidants were similarly tasked with saving the 
ruler from moral and thus political decline.  The mutual trust (‘confidence’) and friendship of 
Hyde’s circle with each other and with, he sometimes asserts, their king, should provide a 
stable reciprocally supportive clique in which frank and honest advice can be exchanged and 
appreciated.65 
 At one level, therefore, counsel is a particular form of sociability.  Clarendon’s essays 
of 1670 linked counsel to the ‘second Education’ of conversation, noting the damage done to 
good natures by evil conversation.  This explains why Hyde, Hatton and Nicholas fretted 
about who dined with Charles II and York.66  An interest in the king’s companions was not 
just a product of the exiled royalist rumour-mill, but also an important marker of who might 
be influencing his character.  Since sociability and friendship fostered the trust which made 
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free speech acceptable to its recipients, the ability to speak candidly signalled counsel was 
working well.  One of the major contributing factors to the war, according to Hyde, was 
royalists’ unwillingness to speak freely and honestly to the king.67  Conversely, when 
conciliar relationships broke down – as in the argument in 1646 over whether to send the 
Prince of Wales to France or to keep him in Jersey – a ‘sudden reservedness and strangeness’ 
resulted.68  Lack of friendship, reproof and freedom of conversation and counsel were linked 
results, symptoms and causes of the Civil War.69 
 Under what circumstances was Hyde prepared to speak freely to the king?  A 
distinction must be drawn between criticism of appointments and of policy.  Despite his 
dislike of many of his fellow exiles in the 1650s, Hyde maintained his position that the king 
alone should choose his privy councillors.  Wary of the ways in which parliament had first 
criticised and then demanded control over conciliar appointments, he told Nicholas that to 
object to the king’s choice was tantamount to rebellion.  Even to speak openly in council 
against the king’s preferred appointees would be unacceptable.  Although he might dislike a 
fellow councillor, ‘where it cannot be altered I do assist him’ since to deliberately thwart him 
would be to act ‘no less a Rebel than Cromwell’.70  Even more than this, such men must have 
full knowledge of the king’s affairs: secrecy was necessary outside the council, but within it 
‘we must consult with those whom he chooses’.  Yet Hyde distinguished conciliar collegiality 
from ‘the entire communication as is necessary to friendship’.71  Friendship requires ‘entire 
Confidence and Communication’, ‘faithful Counsel’ and ‘the Authority of Reprehension’, but 
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counsel can exist without friendship (or was part of an inferior type of friendship among less 
good men).72  Whether Hyde believed that counsel to a king replicated the ordinary structures 
of proper friendship or saw this as a unique type of interaction is hard to pin down.  He 
wavers over this in his essay ‘Of Friendship’: according to classical principles that friends 
must be social equals, it is impossible for kings.  Yet he then urges kings to have a friend if 
possible.73  Maybe Hyde thought that true friendship with a king was possible, but never 
achieved this with either monarch with whom he worked, in contrast to the real friendships he 
forged with Nicholas and Ormond.  Lack of friendship meant that both kings were unwilling 
to accept Hyde’s unpalatable advice. 
 While a king’s choice of unsavoury fellow-councillors had to be accepted, there were 
certain policies which Hyde felt unable to endorse.  Often these involved the ‘expedients’ of a 
French or Scottish alliance, or the passage of the Prince of Wales to France.  This rejection of 
Catholic or Presbyterian alliances was not a retrospective autobiographical fiction but a 
stance which can be found in Hyde’s 1640s correspondence.  Indeed, the rejection of ‘this 
wilderness of prudential motives and expedients’ made Hyde protest in November 1648 that 
he was no fit counsellor.  His insistence that he could serve the Queen ‘with all integrity and 
fidelity, reserving only so much liberty of judgment as an honest man cannot part with’ raises 
the question of the extent to which Hyde would have accepted royal decisions with which he 
disagreed.74  A counsellor had a duty to give unwelcome advice.  They ought to submit to the 
king’s decisions but did not, he claimed, have actively to obey or endorse those they disliked.  
Thus he submitted to the decision that Prince Charles be sent from Jersey to Paris for his 
safety in 1646, but never endorsed it, and flatly refused to accompany him. 
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 In his professions of willingness to withdraw from counsels he found distasteful, 
immediately followed by pleas to get himself back into the action, Hyde was the heir of 
William Cecil: counsel was their political oxygen, the air they breathed.  Like Cecil, Hyde 
was willing to strain the boundaries of criticism of royal policy, to find policies incompatible 
with his conscience and to yearn for retirement.  But, just like Cecil, he did not wish to be left 
out.  In his letter of November 1648, immediately after his plea that he might be an unfit 
counsellor, he urged the Queen to call Charles I’s councillors (including himself) to attend 
the Prince in France.75  After a flow of letters begging for renewed favour, he wrote to 
Nicholas in March 1650 – the point at which Charles was engaged in detailed negotiations 
with Scottish Covenanters – stating that however much he might wish his friend to enjoy an 
easy retirement it was vital to serve the king if called to his council.  Perhaps the result was 
explosive.  It was at this time that Sir John Berkeley, who had been subjected to a series of 
letters from Hyde urging him not to abandon moral foundations for expedients (read: the 
Church of England for Covenanters), wrote to Hyde complaining of his ‘overweening’ 
invectives.76 
 Unwelcome advice had to be carefully offered.  Royalists engaged in a variety of 
strategies for so doing, citing a duty to serve their king, their conscience or their birth as 
justifications for criticism.77  Henrietta Maria could invoke her love for the king, perhaps in a 
unique way, to offer unwelcome advice.78  Warning the Duke of York against rumours that 
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he was planning to convert to Catholicism, George Morley, future bishop of Worcester and 
Winchester, enacted all the unspoken rules of counsel.  Morley apologised for it, he sought 
permission to give it, he gave it in a discreet conversation, he adopted a posture of humility 
and begged pardon again at the end: 
 I desired him to give me leave to speak something to him, which I conceived 
myself obliged unto in conscience towards God and in duty to his Highness 
and the whole Royal Family.  He told me he would hear me very willingly, 
and then withdrawing to a window he bid me speak freely … Sir, said I, I 
humbly and earnestly beseech you to consider, whether there can possibly be 
any thing more prejudicial to the King’s, and next to the King’s, to your 
Highness’s own interests and pretensions in England than that it should be 
generally believed or probably suspected, that the King or your Highness are 
Papists, or at least well affected to, or favourers of those that are of that 
religion … I concluded with begging his Highness’s pardon for the liberty I 
had taken in speaking to him.  His answer was, that he did not only pardon but 
thank me, and should do so as often as I told him of any thing that so much 
concerned him.79 
Clarendon likewise proceeded cautiously when required to give unwelcome counsel, also 
using a parrhesiastic apology when advising Charles II on how to be reconciled with his 
estranged wife.  Never in his correspondence or in his later recollections did he invoke 
friendship as a justification for advice at the moment of providing counsel to kings, although 
he cited it often in discussions with his own clique.80   
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 In his Life Clarendon naturally depicted the king as willing to be admonished by him.  
Nevertheless the repeated sense is of counsel rejected.81  Perhaps the only solace for the 
rejected counsellor was a clear conscience.  As Morley noted, all that he expected from his 
harangue of York was ‘but the comfort I shall find in having discharged mine own 
conscience’.82  But this does not mean that the rejected counsellor is the failed counsellor.  
This raises an important question about how we judge the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of political 
counsel.  At the highest level success obviously involves one’s advice being followed.  But, 
even if it is ignored, lack of punishment for giving it is a form of victory: signifying mutual 
agreement between monarch and subject of the legitimacy of that person giving advice on a 
particular topic at a certain time.  This type of second order success was available to 
Clarendon until 1667, when his impeachment shattered his sense of being accepted as a royal 
counsellor and servant.  
 
VI 
 
Forged in the circumstances of civil war and exile, Clarendon’s writings on counsel manifest 
the concerns of a particular group of royalists about the risks of eroding the moral 
foundations of kingship.  Their fears were less of their Parliamentarian and republican 
opponents than of their royalist companions-in-arms who sought restoration at almost any 
cost.  Getting Charles I and Charles II to hear the correct advice was of immediate political 
importance, in terms of preventing a policy of Catholic or Presbyterian military alliance.  But 
counsel also played a crucial role in ensuring the monarch would restrain themselves from 
violating the ancient laws of the realm, and in rooting rule in a morally-grounded sense of 
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good kingship.  Well-counselled kings would avoid the excesses of the Personal Rule and 
thereby prevent Parliamentarian radicalism as well.  To royalists of this bent, respect for the 
institution of the privy council was an important marker of royal willingness to follow 
conciliar proprieties, but the duties of a good counsellor were embodied in an oath, not an 
institution.  For Clarendon, king and counsellors were above all bound to a set of moral 
fundamentals which would provide their guiding lights in navigating political realities.  To 
counsel was a constant exercise in casuistry, successful management of which would bring 
the monarchy safe ashore in England again. 
 Clarendon’s writings demonstrate that the idea of counsel was far from ‘redundant’ 
after 1642.  It retained a leading place in concepts of good rule.  Though Clarendon looks like 
a firm advocate of a constitutional monarchy paired with a strong institutional council, he is 
better understood as an advocate of counsel – a diffuse element of sociability and friendship 
as well as a quotidian political activity.  Clarendon’s writings offer no naïve, utopian or banal 
faith in generic good counsel.  Rather, they evidence deep recognition of the difficulties 
involved in making advice work.  Hyde was concerned with some fundamental problems of 
advice-giving: how its moral requirements could work in reality, how to cooperate with 
undesirable fellow-councillors, how to engage with recalcitrant kings and how to keep 
counsel secret.  These were not new questions, but the events of the 1640s, 1650s and 1660s 
brought them to the forefront of royalists’ minds.  Counsel properly understood would deflate 
parliament’s pretensions to power-sharing and would restrict any risk of a Catholic or 
Presbyterian backed restoration. 
 Hyde never stopped thinking about counsel.  In his ‘Essay on an Active and a 
Contemplative Life’, penned in his second exile of the early 1670s, he praised a life of 
service to other men through giving ‘gentle and civil cautions and animadversions’, a nexus 
of mutual improvement which fulfils the virtue of charity because ‘no charity is comparable 
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to the charity of instruction and of seasonable reprehension’.83  This was a political as well as 
social comment, as the Essay tilted increasingly in its latter stages towards an overtly political 
sense of activity and a thinly disguised plea for a return to Charles II’s government.  A bitter 
reflection that witty men mock ‘sobriety of advice’ and make ‘ridiculous’ its giver (recalling 
the way in which Clarendon’s enemy, the king’s mistress Barbara Castlemaine, mimicked 
him) was coupled with an insistence that the virtuous are still obliged to give advice, however 
slandered, and an ever-optimistic sense that a monarch would eventually realise this was for 
their own good, though temporarily blinded by ‘passion or appetite’.84  Like so many before 
him, Clarendon looked to counsel to solve the problems of monarchy.  None knew better than 
he that advice often went unheeded, partly because of his opponents at court, partly because 
the two monarchs he served were flawed.  Yet he was obliged to keep trying: obliged by 
charitable service to his fellow men and especially bound by the oath he had solemnly sworn.  
However problematic counsel proved, it could not be given up, for to abandon counsel would 
mean surrendering the fundamentals of monarchy. 
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